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BACKGROUND: General practitioners (GPs) are often
faced with complicated, vague problems in situations of
uncertainty that they have to solve at short notice. In
such situations, gut feelings seem to play a substantial
role in their diagnostic process. Qualitative research
distinguished a sense of alarm and a sense of reassur-
ance. However, not every GP trusted their gut feelings,
since a scientific explanation is lacking.
OBJECTIVE: This paper explains how gut feelings arise
and function in GPs’ diagnostic reasoning.
APPROACH: The paper reviews literature from medical,
psychological and neuroscientific perspectives.
CONCLUSIONS: Gut feelings in general practice are
based on the interaction between patient information
and a GP’s knowledge and experience. This is visualized
in a knowledge-based model of GPs’ diagnostic reason-
ing emphasizing that this complex task combines
analytical and non-analytical cognitive processes.
The model integrates the two well-known diagnostic
reasoning tracks of medical decision-making and
medical problem-solving, and adds gut feelings as a
third track. Analytical and non-analytical diagnostic
reasoning interacts continuously, and GPs use ele-
m e n t so fa l lt h r e et r a c k s ,d e p e n d i n go nt h et a s ka n d
the situation. In this dual process theory, gut feelings
emerge as a consequence of non-analytical processing
of the available information and knowledge, either
reassuring GPs or alerting them that something is
wrong and action is required. The role of affect as a
heuristic within the physician’sk n o w l e d g en e t w o r k
explains how gut feelings may help GPs to navigate in
a mostly efficient way in the often complex and
uncertain diagnostic situations of general practice.
Emotion research and neuroscientific data support
the unmistakable role of affect in the process of
making decisions and explain the bodily sensation of
gut feelings.The implications for health care practice
and medical education are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
General practitioners (GPs) recognize the feeling of sudden
heightened awareness or alarm that sometimes emerges
during a consultation: ‘There’s something wrong with this
patient but I don’t know exactly what. I have to do something
because a delay can be harmful.’
1–4 These intuitive feelings,
which are generally defined as thoughts that come to mind
without apparent effort,
5,6 seem to play a role in the diagnostic
process of GPs when they have to deal with uncertainty and
unpredictability in complex situations. Since these situations
are characteristic of medical practice,
7–9 it is remarkable that
in medicine this role has hardly been studied among doctors
and is not well understood.
In contrast, the role of intuition in diagnostic reasoning has
been extensively investigated in nursing, and results show that
intuition is an integral part of nurses’ decision making and is
assumed to be based in expert knowledge.
10–14 Recent
research into the role of intuition in general practice found
that many GPs experience so-called gut feelings in their
diagnostic reasoning about patients.
15 These gut feelings can
be regarded as a specific kind of intuitive feelings since they
are usually confined to prognostic assessments of the patient’s
situation and are often accompanied by bodily sensations.
They may act as a compass, steering GPs through busy office
hours and enabling them to handle complex problems. Two
types of gut feelings can be discerned: a sense of alarm and a
sense of reassurance.
16 The ‘sense of alarm’ implies that a GP
worries about a patient’s health status, even though they have
found no specific indications yet; it is the sense of ‘there’s
something wrong here.’ It means that the GP needs to initiate
specific management to prevent serious health problems. The
‘sense of reassurance’ means that a GP feels secure about the
further management and course of a patient’s problem, even
though they may not be certain about the diagnosis: ‘every-
thing fits in.’ Although the role of gut feelings in GP’s
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197diagnostic reasoning has been described, a scientific explana-
tion for the phenomenon is still lacking.
The purpose of this article is to show that gut feelings in
general practice as a specific form of intuition are based on the
interaction between patient information and a GP’so w n
knowledge and experience. Gut feelings may provide useful
information in the diagnostic reasoning process, prompting
further thinking and action. To explain the role of gut feelings
in diagnostic reasoning, we first discuss the two main
approaches used to describe the cognitive processes underly-
ing clinical diagnosis, i.e., medical decision-making and med-
ical problem-solving.
17 We then review relevant literature on
intuition and intuitive processes in medicine and highlight
dual-process theories. We describe the role of affect as a
mental shortcut in diagnostic reasoning. Next, we provide
neuroscientific data supporting the view that emotions play
a role in cognitive processes and can be bodily experienced.
Subsequently, we present a model of the diagnostic reason-
ing process, in which the role of gut feelings as a non-
analytical mode of reasoning has been added to the well-
defined diagnostic tracks of medical decision-making and
medical problem-solving. Finally, the implications of this
model for health care practice and medical education are
discussed, and options for further research are outlined.
MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING
Medical decision-making (MDM) models are concerned with
diagnostic reasoning as an opinion revision process.
17 They
make use of Bayes’ theorem, likelihood ratios, prior and
posterior odds, thresholds, schemes and decision trees to
arrive at the best diagnostic and therapeutic decisions.
17–21
These mathematical models, incorporating clinical epidemio-
logical data, are related to the concept of evidence-based
medicine and constitute a standard for best practice. It is
assumed that these models help physicians avoid cognitive
biases and mistakes that arise by relying on one’so w n
knowledge base.
17,22,23 The MDM literature emphasizes that
intuitive hunches may be false and therefore advocates the use
of analytical models and decisions aids, as well as the
monitoring of intuitive ideas by checking for biases before
deciding. For example, when physicians diagnose a patient
with a disease related to but outside their specialty, they
impose their prior knowledge on the situation
24 and
interpret the case from their frame of reference, activating
other hypotheses than specialists do. Ideas that first spring
to mind determine further thinking and actions, so
other relevant information may be ignored or only data
confirming the current hypothesis may be considered and
sought.
However, the use of analytical methods does not always
seem to guarantee objective outcomes. Although clinicians are
Bayesians by nature in their diagnostic reasoning, and the
patient’s history, signs and symptoms represent powerful
information for updating prior probabilities,
25 GPs do not
calculate a running tally of likelihood ratios.
26,27 The assess-
ment of prior probabilities is based on their knowledge of
patients and their expertise, and is usually expressed on an
ordinal scale from very unlikely to almost certain. GPs add
evidence to a prior probability instead of multiplying evidence
by a prior chance.
28 They base the values needed for use in
formulas on subjective evaluations.
29,30 Furthermore, the
power of a diagnostic indicator to confirm or exclude is mostly
assessed in terms like insignificant, weak, good, strong or very
strong, and GPs usually apply their own estimated decision
thresholds when deciding whether to wait, initiate further
examinations or take action.
21,31
Whereas evidence-based medicine originally closely followed
the MDM approach,
32 it now stands for ‘integrating individual
clinical expertise with the best available external clinical
evidence from systematic research.’
33 Scientific knowledge
a l o n ei sn o tas u f f i c i e n tg u i d e , as based on their expertise
and skills clinicians need to acquire and integrate informa-
tion on the condition of the individual patient, his or her
preferences, and the best evidence.
33,34 We may conclude
that in medical decision-making practitioners have to find a
balance between analytical reasoning and a kind of intuitive
assessment.
MEDICAL PROBLEM-SOLVING
Research into medical problem-solving regards diagnostic
reasoning as a process of generating and testing hypothe-
ses.
17,35,36 This process has not been found to differ between
successful and unsuccessful diagnosticians, nor between
experts and novices.
36,37 The difference between them arise
from the underlying knowledge base that enables experienced
physicians, in routine cases, to automatically retrieve the
correct diagnostic hypotheses based on only a few relevant
signs and symptoms.
36,38,39 Their knowledge also guides them
in an efficient information search and treatment planning. The
direct retrieval of relevant knowledge is an automatic, non-
analytical process that, in the case of diagnosis, is often referred
to as pattern recognition.
17,39 Clinicians immediately under-
stand a patient’s problem in diagnostic terms based on an
automatic information integration process such as categoriza-
tion and problem representation
17,40,41 or on the instant
recognition of similarity to a previously seen case stored in
memory.
39,42 In general practice, contextual factors such as age,
gender, prior medical history, drug use, family history and social
context play an important role in generating accurate diagnostic
hypotheses since they may make the presence of a disease more
likely or less likely.
38 GPs generally know the way their patients
normally behave or speak, enabling them to compare this with
the current presentation. GPs’ contextual knowledge is a major
diagnostic tool in recognizing disorders.
43–45
Analytical reasoning is invoked in more complex cases when
a diagnosis is not readily available and in the deliberate
verification and testing of hypotheses.
17,39. Clinicians may then
rely on their clinical knowledge by listing patient features,
weighing them up, and mapping them to the signs and
symptoms known to be associated with certain diseases.
Alternatively, they can engage in causal reasoning with biomed-
ical knowledge to bridge the gaps between the elements in the
clinical picture.
46,47 If we conceptualize medical knowledge as
an associative network including interconnected knowledge
parts such as contextual information, signs and symptoms,
causes of disease, diagnostics, pathophysiological mechanisms,
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treatments, drugs and previously seen cases,
41,48 we can
explain the flexibility of knowledge use when experience is
gained in a domain. As medical expertise develops, the knowl-
edge network becomes richer, more diversified, better coordi-
nated and attuned to the patients encountered, so the right
knowledge will be activated at the right time.
39,41,48 With
experience, therefore, clinical reasoning becomes more auto-
matic and non-analytical, allowing fast and efficient diagnosis
and treatment, while the rich knowledge base can be accessed, if
necessary, in a more deliberate and analytical way.
INTUITION
Whereas the literature discussed above does not use intuition
as a concept, the role of intuition in medical problem-solving is
explicitly addressed in other traditions.
49–52 In the cognitive
continuum theory, intuition and analysis are defined as two
modes of cognition that can be placed at the ends of a
continuum, where intuition refers to rapid, unconscious
processing and low control, and analysis refers to slow,
conscious and controlled processing.
30,52 A lot of thinking is
situated somewhere in between, and the appropriate mode of
thought depends on the specific task characteristics. Doctors
need to match the cognitive processes to the task requirements
to be accurate. In their theory of expertise, Dreyfus and
Dreyfus emphasize
49 that expertise develops with experience
and thinking proceeds in several stages from analytical to
almost completely intuitive. Intuitive processes are so fast that
one just knows or acts without being aware where the thought
or action comes from. The knowledge on which it is based is
not directly accessible and in any case not explicitly used.
Hence, it is referred to by some authors as tacit knowl-
edge.
50,53,54 Polanyi introduced this term to emphasize that
personal knowledge is built on a wealth of experience that is
not verbalizable: ‘that which we know but cannot tell.’
53 It is
tied to the practices from which it is acquired, and often
results from informal and implicit learning.
48,50 This experi-
ential knowledge is part of the highly interconnected network
of knowledge of medical experts,
39,48 and may lead to both
routine action and reflection.
55 ‘Not feeling right,’ for example,
is regarded as the outcome of an implicit monitoring process
that may trigger immediate intervention, further thinking or
even deliberate learning, depending on the situation.
50
Intuition can thus be explained as the outcome of highly
personalized knowledge-based, non-analytical processes that
may help physicians deal with the complexity of the tasks they
face.
51
DUAL PROCESSES
Psychological dual-process theories contrast analytical rea-
soning and non-analytical reasoning as two modes of knowing
and thinking.
6,56–59 The analytical system is explicit, con-
trolled, rational, effortful and relatively slow. In clinical rea-
soning, analytical thinking is present in deliberately generating
and testing of diagnostic hypotheses, in causal reasoning with
biomedical knowledge and in the use of decision tools. The
non-analytical system is implicit, based on automatic and
effortless thought processes, and is associative, intuitive and
fast. Non-analytical reasoning can be recognized both in
medical decision-making and in medical problem-solving, for
instance in automatic chance assessment processes and in
pattern recognition. The interaction between these two sys-
tems is considered to determine the output of the whole
thought process. The outcomes of the non-analytical system
can be reflected upon by the analytical system and accepted or
elaborated upon for further understanding and investigation
or to provide explanations.
6
Non-analytical, intuitive thinking is explained in terms of
the high accessibility of the immediate thoughts.
6,60 Prolonged
practice and specific training make useful thoughts more
easily accessible, enabling accurate intuitive performance.
This explanation concurs with the knowledge acquisition
processes described in the medical problem-solving tradition,
and the explanation of intuition in clinical reasoning research.
The cognitive continuum theory
30,52 in particular can be
regarded as an early form of dual process theory. Although
gut feelings as such do not feature in any of these theories, the
affect heuristic described in decision-making research
6,60,61 as
the intuitive positive and negative feelings guiding decisions
comes close to our description of a sense of reassurance and a
sense of alarm. We assume that these (gut) feelings also
originate in the knowledge and experience gained over time
and may therefore contribute to the diagnostic process.
EMOTIONS IN MAKING DECISIONS
The guiding role of affect in making decisions has been
demonstrated in various research traditions. In research on
judgment and choice, affect is defined as a feeling of ‘goodness’
or ‘badness’ that is elicited by the positive or negative quality
attached by experience to the object of thought.
61,62 This
response depends on the interaction between an individual
and a specific context. Reliance on such feelings is character-
ized as the affect heuristic, a mental shortcut preceding
deliberate, analytical thinking that helps people to navigate in
a mostly efficient way in complex, uncertain and sometimes
dangerous situations. This function of affect and emotions is
the hallmark of the experiential system in Epstein’sd u a l
process theory.
58
Research on emotions encompasses affect but is broader in
scope.
62 It includes many theories and definitions of emotions
that vary in focus
63–67 For our purpose, it seems important to
note that emotions may be triggered by the unconscious
interpretation of information in the environment, are often
accompanied by bodily sensations and physical changes,
provide information that motivates and directs action or
further thinking, and have adaptive value. Of particular
interest for the sense of alarm are emotions invoked by stimuli
like signs and symptoms that do not fit into a familiar pattern
of a disease or a patient. These unusual stimuli arouse
curiosity and explorative behavior, but also keen expectation
and fear.
65
Cognitive neuroscience research also provides support for
the view that emotions significantly contribute to decision-
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68,69 Patient studies have shown that this
complex process is disrupted when emotions are ‘eliminated.’
Patients who have sustained damage in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex evinced a generally flat affect and an
inability to react to emotional situations, in addition to
repeatedly making decisions that were detrimental to their
well-being.
68,69 Notwithstanding perfectly functioning intel-
lectual capacities, this damage led to incorrect assessments
of the social impact of their behavior in terms like ‘good, safe
and advantageous’ or ‘bad, risky and disadvantageous.’ It
seemed as if they did not learn from previous experiences.
Further experimental studies showed that although they
could register the consequences of their behavior, they could
not anticipate them.
68,70
T h e s ef i n d i n g sh a v eb e e ne x p l a i n e db yt h es o m a t i c - m a r k e r
hypothesis,
68,69 which describes how brain structures are
involved in decision-making processes. Consequences of
behavior processed in the sensory cortex induce the amygda-
la to elicit emotional bodily responses via effector nuclei in the
brain stem. Through a learning process, these responses
(somatic markers) become linked to mental representations
of this specific behavior in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
which are stored in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In
decision making, therefore, the same emotional responses
are elicited when experiencing or envisioning the behavior
that brought them about in the past. Subsequently, they are
processed either at the cortical level, evoking conscious “gut
feelings” of positive or negative affect, or at the subcortical
level, influencing decision making in a nonconscious way. At
the cortical level, functional imaging studies suggest that the
insular cortex is involved in representing awareness of
subjective feelings and has a role in guiding mental and
physical behavior.
68,71,72
The brain is a complex, integrated system of functional
networks distributed across multiple sites, and other struc-
t u r e sh a v ea l s ob e e nf o u n dt ob ei n v o l v e di nd e c i s i o n
making.
63,64,71 However, the above discussion clearly sug-
gests that emotions are a vital component of this cognitive
process, helping us to thread our ways through the huge
amount of information and knowledge available.
DIAGNOSTIC REASONING MODEL
Summarizing our narrative review of the literature, we may
learn that medical decision-making models make use of
intuitive assessments of chances based on experiential knowl-
edge, although their proponents generally warn against any
form of intuitions. Medical problem-solving theories afford the
insight that knowledge and experience underlie non-analytical
(including gut feelings) and analytical diagnostic reasoning,
although the role of emotions is not made explicit at all. Dual
process theories describe the role of intuition in making
decisions and can provide an explanation for gut feelings as
an affect heuristic. Emotion research and neuroscientific data
support the unmistakable role of emotions in the decision-
making process and explain the bodily sensation of gut
feelings. We propose therefore to consider gut feelings as a
separate track in GPs’ diagnostic reasoning that complements
the other two tracks.
We present a model of GPs’ diagnostic reasoning in which it
is visualized as a mix of analytical and non-analytical reason-
ing processes, where the three tracks of diagnostic reasoning,
medical decision-making, medical problem-solving and gut
feelings, collaborate within a GP’s knowledge network (Fig. 1).
Depending on the task (routine or more complicated) and
the situation (being familiar with a patient and a disease or
not), GPs use elements of all three tracks. With increasing
experience, their knowledge network will become richer and
more coherent, and non-analytical reasoning will more often
Figure 1. Knowledge-based model of GPs’ diagnostic reasoning.
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analytical reasoning when the automatic approach is not
enough to explain the patient’s situation. The sense of alarm
can be regarded as the first warning sign that automatically
pops up from the knowledge network to slow down when no
familiar pattern can be identified. Sometimes no satisfactory
explanation can as yet be found, but prompt intervention is
necessary bypassing a diagnosis. And sometimes GPs can
feel reassured about the expected course of an illness even if
they have as yet no clear diagnosis.
IMPLICATIONS
Our explanation of the role of gut feelings in GPs’ diagnostic
reasoning has several important implications for health care
practice and medical education. At the very least, it means
that gut feelings need to be taken seriously. When GPs and
trainees recognize a sense of alarm, they should be alerted to
slow down and switch to analytical reasoning. Sharing these
experiences with colleagues might help to understand what
pattern of signs and symptoms caused these feelings and to
determine the best step to take next. In medical education,
trainees should be given the opportunity to tell their consul-
tation stories and evaluate the role of gut feelings in the
diagnostic reasoning process. Increased awareness of gut
feelings can help GPs to learn when to trust them and when
to slow down.
Currently, medical educators teach students to reason in
an analytical way, and when GP trainers explain their
diagnostic reasoning about a patient’s problem, they often
make it seem like a logical process of testing plausible
hypotheses or the outcome of a mathematical process. This
retrospective reconstruction of seemingly objective reasoning
often excludes the tacit clues and intuitive hunches hidden in
the patient’s story and context, on which the original
diagnosis depended. It also denies the coordinated processes
of analytical and non-analytical reasoning.
42,73 Knowing the
patient’s narrative and its interpretation by an experienced
GP can help trainees and medical students to understand
both aspects of diagnostic reasoning and enable them to
refine their knowledge base.
35,74–76 “Reflection-in-action” by
medical practitioners during the diagnostic process contri-
butes to awareness of their feelings of certainty or uncertain-
ty, assessing the limitations of their knowledge, and
stimulating them to search for feedback and follow-
up.
4,55,77,78 Personal reflection is a trainable, professional
quality that might be improved even in the early stages of
education.
79 Studying and discussing written clinical cases
or video’s of real or simulated patients, specifically aimed at
t h ed i a g n o s t i cr o l eo fg u tf e e l i n g s ,m a yp r o m o t es t u d e n t
recognition of their own gut feelings and sharing of knowl-
edge and experience. Finally, instructions to use a combina-
tion of analytical and non-analytical reasoning have been
demonstrated to improved i a g n o s t i ca c c u r a c y .
80,81
In further research, the incidence of the sense of alarm and
t h es e n s eo fr e a s s u r a n c ei nd a i l yg e n e r a lp r a c t i c es h o u l db e
charted, as well as the way GP-trainers and their trainees
deal with them in the short as well as longer term. This raises
questions such as whether gut feelings trigger reevaluation,
feedback seeking and learning, and whether these initial
feelings are useful compared to the outcomes of further
d i a g n o s t i c sa n dt r e a t m e n t si nt h ec o u r s eo ft h ed i s e a s e .
Follow-up research into outcomes may also be used to
determine the diagnostic value of gut feelings. Assessing the
differences in these predictive values between trainees and
experienced GPs can shed light on the role of experience in
the diagnostic process. Similarly, research into the effects of
knowledge about the context and the patient can be done by
examining differences between situations in which GPs deal
with patients they know or patients they see for the first time
(e.g., when they are on call). We are addressing these topics
u s i n gas h o r tq u e s t i o n n a i r ew eh a v ed e v e l o p e dt or e c o r dg u t
feelings in general practice based on the consensus state-
ments about the sense of alarm and sense of reassurance.
16
This questionnaire is now being validated using a set of
written clinical cases that differ in the type and extent of gut
feelings to be triggered, as classified by a group of experi-
enced GPs and diagnosed by a large group of experienced
GPs. This instrument could also be used to study the role of
gut feelings in diagnostic reasoning in a more fundamental
and experimental way. For example, clinical cases could be
written that vary in the amount of contextual and patient
knowledge, and could be presented for diagnosis to trainees
and GPs with different levels of expertise, followed by the
questionnaire. This would also allow the effects of education-
al interventions to be tested. Finally, physiological measure-
m e n t so fe m o t i o n sa n di m a g i n gs t u d i e so fG P s ’ diagnostic
reasoning processes with different clinical cases may test the
somatic-marker hypothesis in a realistic medical setting.
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